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OPSOMMING
Oordeeloor risiko vir negatiewe gebeurtenisse in sekere situasies is ondersoek by "n
groep mediese nooddienspersoneel met "n diagnose van posttraumatiese
stresversteuring (PTSV; n = 27) en "n groep sonder PTSV (n = 74). Deelnemers het
die PTSD Symptom Scale: Self-Report version (Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum,
1993), "n mediese nooddiens werkservaringe-vraelys, die Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), en "n gebeurtenis-waarskynlikheidsvraelys wat
opgestel is om oordeeloor risiko te meet, voltooi. Deelnemers met PTSV het die
mate van risiko betrokke oorskat in vergelyking met deelnemers sonder PTSVen
sodoende "n beoordelingsydigheid vir risiko-verbandhoudende situasies
gedemonstreer. In die huidige studie is gevind dat beoordelingsydigheid by PTSV
deelnemers nie beperk was tot eksterne skade-verbandhoudende gebeurtenisse nie,
maar dat dit ook veralgemeen het na algemene negatiewe gebeurtenisse (sonder
potensieel skadelike gevolge), negatiewe sosiale gebeurtenisse, en negatiewe
werksverwante gebeurtenisse. Daar is gevind dat, wat PTSV-simptomatologie betref,
vermyding die beste voorspeller van beoordelingsydigheid was. Die resultate van die
huidige studie word bespreek in terme van kognitiewe klinies-sielkundige teorieë van
PTSV, wat die aanwesigheid van beoordelingsydigheid voorspel, en kognitiewe
eksperimentele-sielkunde verklarings van die effek van negatiewe emosionele
toestande op beoordelingsprosesse.
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ABSTRACT
Judgement of risk for negative events in certain situations was investigated in a
group of emergency medical service (EMS) personnel with a diagnosis of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; n = 27) and a group without PTSD (n = 74).
Participants completed the PTSD Symptom Scale: Self-Report version (Faa, Riggs,
Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993), an EMS work experiences questionnaire, the Beck
Depression Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), and an event probability
questionnaire designed to assess judgement of risk. Participants with PTSD
overestimated amount of risk involved in comparison to participants without PTSD,
thereby demonstrating a judgement bias for risk related events. The present study
found that the judgement bias in PTSD participants extended to include not just
external harm related events but also general negative events (without potential
threatening/harmful consequences), negative social events, and negative work-
related events. Of the posttraumatic symptomatology assessed, avoidance
symptomatology was found to be the best predictor of judgement bias. The results of
the present study are discussed in terms of the cognitive clinical psychology theories
of PTSD, which predict the manifestation of judgement bias in PTSD, and cognitive
experimental psychology explanations of the effect of negative emotional states on
judgement processes.
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1. Introduction
When an individual experiences a traumatic event certain negative psychological
consequences may arise. Although no single outcome from exposure to a
traumatic event can be expected a distinct cluster of symptoms is often
identifiable and associated with a pathological reaction to a traumatic stressor. In
1980 the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-III) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 1980)
provided the framework for a concept termed posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). The diagnostic specification was largely influenced by Horowitz's (1976,
1979) work on the phenomenology of trauma-related reactions.
It is clear that the criteria that define PTSD are by no means exhaustive with
respect to the types of reactions that individuals experience following a traumatic
event. The concept does however provide a useful and coherent framework
within which to consider these reactions. Consequently, the present discussion
will concentrate on PTSD, as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders: Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 1994), as an exemplar of the
kinds of emotional reactions that people experience. A diagnosis of PTSD is only
made one month after the traumatic event. Psychopathological reactions with a
similar symptom profile are diagnosed as an acute stress disorder (ASD) in the
interim period (APA, 1994).
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PTSD diverges from most other psychiatric disorders in that it includes an
etiological variable in its criteria. PTSD is primarily characterised by the
experience of a traumatic event. The traumatic event may be experienced in one
of the following ways: directly experiencing a traumatic event, witnessing a
traumatic event, or being confronted with an event that involves actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or
others. The person's response to the traumatic event must involve fear,
helplessness, or horror (APA, 1994).
Symptomatic experiences that typify PTSD are broadly divided into three distinct
but related categories by the DSM-IV. The first category includes certain intrusive
symptoms: re-experiencing of the traumatic event through nightmares,
flashbacks, and/or intrusive memories. The second category contains certain
avoidance symptoms: inhibitory cognitive and behavioural processes such as
avoidance of associated stimuli, social withdrawal, and emotional numbing where
the individual is unable to feel a range of emotions. Finally, in the third category
one finds symptoms of hyperarousal, including hypervigilance, irritability and an
exaggerated startle response.
Emergency medical service (EMS) personnel constitute one group who is at
particular risk for developing PTSD (Weiss, Marmar, Metzler, & Ronfeldt, 1995).
They are confronted with scenes of death, mutilation, personal risk, and involved
in high anxiety situations by virtue of the task nature of their occupation (A.
2
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Crossley, personal communication, August 1999; Paton & Violanti, 1996). For the
purpose of the present study EMS personnel are defined as medical care
workers (e.g., ambulance persons) who provide emergency and rescue services
in the pre-hospital phase of care (i.e., before a patient is admitted to a hospital).
Grevin (1996) likened the trauma suffered by EMS personnel to that suffered by
soldiers on the battlefield. She related this to the chronic high exposure to human
suffering and death, and working in hazardous environments on a continuous
basis. Grevin found that the level of posttraumatic stress was not related to years
of experience in the EMS profession, indicating that factors other than chronic
exposure to traumatic incidents play a significant role in the development of
PTSD.
In order to assess the various occupational aspects that may be associated with
posttraumatic stress reactions in EMS workers, Beaton, Murphy, Johnson, Pike,
and Corneil (1998) asked urban EMS workers to rate the severity of actual and/or
potential duty-related incident stressors. An analysis yielded five occupational
component stressors. Catastrophic injury to self or one's co-worker was deemed
to be the most stressful, followed by the witnessing of gruesome victim incidents,
rendering aid to seriously injured persons, being exposed to vulnerable victims
such as children, minor injury to one's self, and exposure to the death and dying
of others. The results of this study illustrate the various pathways to
psychological trauma experienced by EMS workers, indicating that the traumatic
3
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event may be of a primary (e.g. catastrophic injury to self), or secondary nature
(e.g., rendering aid to a seriously injured child).
The incidence and prevalence of acute stress reactions, and PTSD in EMS
workers has been well-documented (Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Grevin, 1996;
Oosthuizen, 1994; Strydom, 1995). Studies have consistently shown the
prevalence rate of PTSD in EMS to be extremely high in comparison to that in
the general population (Wagner, Heinrichs, & Ehlert, 1998)
In recent years post-trauma research has begun to focus on the role of cognitive
factors in the development and maintenance of PTSD. There is a growing body
of evidence that suggests that cognitive factors may be at least as important as
trauma severity and variations in pre-trauma experience (e.g., Faa, Steketee, &
Rothbaum, 1989; Horowitz, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1985). In addition, research
has begun to investigate the specific nature of cognitive biases found in PTSD
(McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990; Smith & Bryant, in press; Zeitlin &
McNally, 1991).
Research on cognitive bias in PTSD has recently turned to the information-
processing paradigm derived from experimental cognitive psychology (Thrasher
& Dalgleish, 1999). This paradigm has proven useful in accounting for a range of
cognitive phenomena in emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety
disorders) (McNally, 1998; Williams, Watts, Macleod, & Mathews, 1997).
4
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Thrasher and Dalgleish (1999) pronounce the application of the information-
processing paradigm to PTSD to be particularly compelling, as a number of
symptoms of PTSD are suggestive of basic cognitive distortions. For example,
several of the key defining features of PTSD are symptoms that reflect problems
related to perception, attention, and memory processes.
Three main investigation areas within the information-processing approach to
PTSD have been delineated namely attention bias, memory bias, and judgement
bias. Thrasher and Dalgleish (1999) indicate that PTSD research into these
cognitive processes is still in its infancy and that additional research is needed to
investigate these processes. The present study focussed on the judgement of
risk as an exemplar of a cognitive process that may become affected by PTSD,
that is, where the risk for negative events is overestimated. This is referred to as
judgement bias.
The investigation of judgement focuses on how individuals evaluate the
probability of future events occurring under conditions of uncertainty. In a variety
of circumstances individuals are required to make a prediction (judqernent) about
the likelihood of the occurrence of uncertain events. This is an everyday process
and is common to all persons and found in all spheres of life. Examples of this
process include estimating what time a spouse will return home after work,
projecting the price of a loaf of bread next year, or judging the future prognosis of
a patient under treatment.
5
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Events that are judged in terms of the probability of their occurrence vary in
nature. Some can be relatively mundane events such as the likelihood of
receiving your post on time, while others refer to events that may have adverse
consequences should they occur, such as the likelihood of being assaulted. It is
evident that certain events involve a greater degree of negative consequences
and risk. Estimating the likelihood of the occurrence of negative and threatening
events is defined as the judgement of risk.
Individuals are required to make judgements of the likelihood of events
happening in relation to themselves and in relation to other persons. When an
individual judges the likelihood of an event happening to him or herself it is
referred to as a self-referent judgement for example, judging the likelihood of
personally being involved in an accident. When an individual judges the
likelihood of an event happening to another person it is referred to as an other-
referent judgement for example, judging the likelihood of an neighbour being
burgled (Kahneman, Siovic, & Tversky, 1982).
Traditionally, research into the psychological processes underlying judgement
has sought to develop normative idealised models that describe how persons
judge the probability of an event's occurrence (Kahneman, et al., 1982). Perhaps
not surprisingly, many of the decisions which individuals make diverge from the
predictions of these idealised models. In addition it has been observed that some
individuals will judge the probability of an event's occurrence to be much more
6
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likely in comparison to other individuals (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Empirical
investigations of this question often come under the heading of judgement bias
research.
Judgement research is traditionally conducted by asking research participants to
rate the likelihood of an event's occurrence on a Likert-type scale. For example,
when investigating judgement of risk, participants may be asked to rate the
likelihood of having a heart attack, being robbed, or failing an exam. Judgement
bias is in turn assessed by comparing two groups of participants who differ
according to a predetermined variable such as level of anxiety. The participants
are then compared to determine if participants with a high anxiety level judge the
likelihood of the events differently to participants with a low anxiety level. If a
significant difference in judgement of risk is found between the two groups, a
judgement bias is said to be present in the group that gave the higher rating.
The present study considered judgement of risk in PTSD from the information-
processing perspective. The information-processing approach to emotional
disorders utilises theoretical propositions and research from the perspectives of
both cognitive psychology and clinical psychology to conceptualise biases in
cognitive processes (Williams, et al., 1997). Consequently the concept of
judgement of risk bias in PTSD in the present study was examined from both
these perspectives. The clinical psychology perspective (information-processing
theories of PTSD) provides a conceptual framework that predicts the
7
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manifestation and nature of judgement bias in PTSD while the cognitive
psychology perspective provides a description of the mechanisms of judgement
processes under conditions of negative emotion states (i.e., emotional disorders).
The clinical perspective is discussed first, followed by the cognitive psychology
perspective.
Certain information-processing theories of PTSD provide conceptual frameworks
that predict judgement biases in PTSD. The theories of Foa et al. (1989) and
Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson, and Twentyman (1988) are discussed
accordingly.
Applying Lang's (1977, 1979) theory of fear structures as a network in memory
and Foa and Kozak's (1986) adaptation of this analysis to anxiety disorders, Foa
et al. (1989) have outlined an information-processing theory of PTSD. The theory
focuses on the formation of a fear network in long-term memory. It is proposed
that the fear structure (cf. Lang) present in PTSD consists of mental
representations of trauma-related stimuli, information about cognitive,
behavioural, and physiological reactions to the event, and meanings associated
with the stimulus and response elements.
It is proposed that the activation of the fear structure will cause individuals with
PTSD to evidence a range of cognitive biases (Foa et al, 1989). The theory
posits that the activation of the network results in atlentional bias to potential
8
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threats, intrusive thoughts of the trauma (memory bias), and exaggerated beliefs
about trauma-related issues (Litz & Keane, 1989). Judgement bias can be
viewed as a component of exaggerated beliefs about trauma-related issues.
Foa et al. (1989) propose that in contrast to other anxiety disorders, in which fear
structures are more circumscribed, the fear structure in PTSD is more pervasive
regarding stimuli, responses, and meanings that connate danger. The fear
network in PTSD extends to a wider array of situations due to the diffuse and
loosely associated nature of the network (Foa et al. 1989). Consequently
situations previously considered safe become cues for danger. This predicts that
biases in the judgement of risk would extend to a range of threatening situations
including those previously (before the trauma) perceived as benign. Judgement
biases in PTSD are therefore predicted to be more pervasive and extend across
a wide array of threatening situations.
Thrasher and Dalgleish (1999) state that the activation of the fear network makes
it difficult for individuals with PTSD to distinguish between safe situations and
threatening situations. It is proposed that this difficulty in distinguishing between
safe and threatening situations occurs principally with respect to the self. It can
therefore be expected that the exaggerated trauma-related beliefs and
judgement bias in individuals with PTSD will be of a self-referent nature.
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The cognitive action theory of Chemtob et al. (1988) constitutes a second clinical
conceptualisation that predicts judgement bias in PTSD. Chemtob et al. use a
hierarchical fear network model to describe the development and maintenance of
PTSD. They argue that, in individuals with PTSD, the fear network is
permanently activated causing them to function in a way that was adaptive during
the experience of the traumatic incident.
The postulation that threat-related arousal is always activated to some degree
(i.e., potentiated) increases the likelihood that individuals will search for and
identify threatening information (Chemtob et al., 1988). The elements of the fear
network are organised in a feedback loop such that threat-related arousal leads
to threat-seeking behaviour that leads to a greater likelihood of interpreting
ambiguous information as threatening (Jones & Barlow, 1990). The permanent
activation of the fear network in individuals with PTSD causes them to function in
a survival mode whereby attention and memory is biased toward threat-related
information. A consequence of this is that individuals with high levels of PTSD
symptomatology will show a judgement bias for threatening events.
The theories of Foa et al. (1989) and Chemtob et al. (1988) predict the
manifestation of judgement bias in PTSD. A number of cognitive psychology
descriptions of judgement processes serve to explain the mechanisms
responsible for judgement bias in emotional disorders such as PTSD. These will
be considered accordingly.
10
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Tverskyand Kahneman (1974) describe an 'availability heuristic' to explain how
people estimate the probability of an event's occurrence in certain
circumstances. The availability heuristic essentially states that the probability of
the occurrence of an event is a function of the availability in memory of instances
and scenarios similar to the event in question. When judging the probability of an
uncertain event, for example, it may often be useful to base one's estimation on
the ease with which similar examples can be accessed from memory.
The availability heuristic can be used as a framework for understanding how
judgements are influenced by negative emotional states. Johnson and Tversky
(1983) showed that subjects who had read newspaper reports vividly describing
the death of an individual showed increases in the judgement of risk of all causes
of death, rather than specific increases relating to similarity between the
newspaper account and the causes of death to be rated. They proposed that this
was due to the negative emotional reaction resulting from reading the newspaper
report. Johnson and Tversky demonstrated that a negative emotional reaction to
an event increased the availability in memory of similar events and was
consequently a decisive factor in predicting elevated judgement risk.
The findings of Johnson and Tversky (1983) can also be considered from the
"spreading activation" hypothesis (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985). This hypothesis
suggests that a negative emotional state (e.g., fear in PTSD) leads to the
activation in memory of events linked to a particular mood state as predicted by
11
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the network theory of mood and memory of Bower (1981, 1987). It is argued that
the activation spreads equally to all events linked to a particular emotional state
resulting in an increase in the judgement of risk across a range of events.
Research has provided support for this hypothesis showing that a negative
emotional state has an effect on the judgement of risk (Kavanagh & Bower,
1985).
An alternative to the availability heuristic and "spreading activation" account is
the ''feelings as information" hypothesis that indicates that people use their own
mood state as a source of information when making judgements of risk (Schwarz
& Clore, 1983; 1988). This explanation suggests that a particular mood state
serves as evidence for a wide range of judgements, as long as the events to be
judged are congruent with the mood state of the person. When required to judge
the likelihood of an event's occurrence, a person will ask, "how do I feel about it?"
and use their emotional reaction as a guide in estimating the likelihood of the
event occurring. Schwarz and Clore (1988) suggest that the undifferentiated and
unfocused nature of mood states make them informative for a wide range of
judgements. Accordingly, an anxious mood state will result in an increase in the
judgement of risk across a wide range of events.
The availability heuristic, "spreading activation" account, and the "feelings as
information" hypothesis have been shown to have broad descriptive applicability
in understanding the effects of emotional disorders on the judgement of risk
12
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(Williams et al., 1997). These explanations provide insight into the manifestation
of judgement bias in PTSD by providing explanations as to the cognitive
mechanisms involved in the judgement of risk in negative emotional states.
Cognitive bias, in the form of exaggerated judgement of risk, has been studied in
various anxiety disorders such as generalised anxiety (Butler & Mathews, 1983;
1987), agoraphobia (McNally & Foa, 1987), social phobia (Foa, Franklin, Perry, &
Herbert, 1996; Warren, Zgourides, & Jones, 1989), social anxiety (Lucock &
Salkovskis, 1988), and childhood anxiety (Dalgleish et al., 1997). The studies
have consistently shown that judgement bias is evident in anxiety disorders. In
addition it was shown that judgement bias in anxious subjects was of a self-
referent and not of an other-referent nature.
To date three studies have investigated judgement bias in posttraumatic stress
disorders. In the first study Dalgleish (1993) investigated survivors of a ferry
disaster. He asked them to rate the probability of occurrence of a number of
incidents, some relating specifically to transport events. Each item referred either
to the self or another person. Results indicated that survivors with high levels of
PTSD symptoms showed higher judgements of risk across all event types in
comparison to survivors with low PTSD symptomatology. Dalgleish found that the
judgement bias in traumatised survivors was of a self-referent nature.
13
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Warda and Bryant (1998) investigated judgement bias in ASO with motor-vehicle
accident survivors. Individuals were required to rate the likelihood of the
occurrence of a range of negative events. They found that individuals with ASO
overestimated the likelihood that negative events would happen to them in
comparison to individualswithout ASO, that is, a judgement bias was found.
Warda and Bryant (1998) found that avoidance symptomatology was the most
significant factor in accounting for the variance in judgement bias in comparison
to intrusion symptoms and symptoms of depression and general anxiety. They
suggested that this finding indicated that avoidance reactions contribute to
cognitive biases over and above the influence of general anxiety or depression.
Smith and Bryant (in press) investigated the generality of judgement bias in this
population. By diversifying the range of items in the questionnaire to include
items which involve external harm, social anxiety or somatic complaints they
showed that individuals with ASO overestimated the probability of a range of
negative events in comparison to individuals without ASO. This finding provided
support for the theory regarding the wide and diffuse nature of the fear structure
in individuals with PTSO (Foa et al., 1989).
The research on judgement bias in PTSO has supported research conducted
with other anxiety disorder groups. A significant finding is that judgement bias in
PTSO appears to be diffuse and generalised to a variety of domains including
14
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those not directly associated with traumatic events (e.g., somatic complaints). In
other words it appears that judgement bias in PTSD globalises across a diverse
range of events. Research on judgement bias in PTSD is still in its infancy
however and Warda and Bryant (1998) indicate the need for research with other
trauma populations.
EMS personnel can be considered an appropriate population in which to
investigate judgement bias associated with PTSD. It has been shown that EMS
personnel have to endure more traumatic events in a month than members of the
general population can expect to encounter in a lifetime (Paton & Violanti, 1996).
A consequence of this is that EMS personnel have greatly elevated levels of
PTSD in comparison to the general population. EMS personnel constitute a
convenient population in the investigation of judgement bias in PTSD.
The present study subsequently investigated judgement of risk in a group of EMS
personnel. The primary aim of the current study was to establish whether a
diagnosis of PTSD was associated with a judgement bias for negative events. It
was predicted that EMS personnel with PTSD would overestimate the likelihood
of the occurrence of negative events in comparison to EMS personnel without
PTSD, thereby indicating a judgement bias.
15
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In addition, the present study investigated whether judgement bias in PTSD was
generalised across a range of events. This was investigated by determining if
judgement bias was circumscribed to external threat-related events or if
judgement bias was found in other types of negative events (e.g., social events).
It was predicted that judgement bias in EMS personnel with PTSD would extend
across a range of negative events to include events not associated with external
harm or threat.
The present study also sought to determine which component of posttraumatic
symptomatology was the best predictor of judgement bias in EMS personnel. It
was predicted that avoidance symptomatology would be the best predictor of
judgement bias.
2. Method
2.1.Design
A sample of EMS personnel on active duty was assessed for PTSD and
associated symptoms by means of self-report instruments. Demographic and
work-related information was also obtained. Participants were administered a
self-report questionnaire which assessed the subjective judgement of risk. To
determine whether PTSD was associated with a judgement bias, participants
with PTSD were compared to participants without PTSD in terms of judgement of
16
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risk scores. An investigation was subsequently conducted to determine which
dimension of posttraumatic symptomatology was the best predictor of judgement
bias.
2.2. Participants
The present study was conducted in co-operation with the personnel of the
Western Cape Metropolitan Emergency Medical and Rescue Services and the
Ambulance Training College in Cape Town. Permission was obtained from the
Director of Health Support Services of the Western Cape to complete the
research. One hundred and one EMS workers in the Western Cape were
included in the final sample of the study. The group consisted of EMS personnel
actively involved in emergency medical care work.
Participants were only included in the study if they had experienced a traumatic
event in the previous year. Participants were categorised according to their
scores on the PTSD Symptom Scale (PSS-SR; Foa, et al., 1993). Participants
were considered to suffer from PTSD if they met the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD
(APA, 1994) as diagnosed on the PSS-SR and if they scored 18 or more on the
severity of symptoms scale of the PSS-SR. The aim of the inclusion of the '18 or
more' severity score was to ensure that those participants who met the criteria for
PTSD experienced at least moderate symptom severity.
17
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The groups used in this study were as follows. The No PTSD group rn = 74; 70
men and 4 women) failed the criteria for PTSD as defined above. The PTSD
group (n = 27; 24 men and 3 women) met the requirements for PTSD at the time
of assessment.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. EMS Work Experiences Questionnaire (EWEQ)
The EWEQ was specifically designed for the purpose of the present study. The
first question assessed whether participants had experienced a traumatic event.
(Criterion A of PTSD of the DSM - IV). The following section assessed the
frequency of exposure to a list of 33 duty-related traumatic experiences.
Participants were required to indicate frequency of exposure to each of the
events, using a 4-point scale where 0 = never, 1 = seldom, 2 = sometimes, and 3
= often. The duty-related items were principally taken from a study by Beaton et
al. (1998). Further items, which were specifically related to the work experiences
of South African EMS personnel, were included. These items were generated by
experienced paramedics of the Ambulance Training College and EMS personnel
directly involved in the psychological debriefing of EMS personnel.
The purpose of the questionnaire was firstly, to assess whether participants had
been exposed to a traumatic event (Criterion A of PTSD) and secondly, to
determine frequency of exposure to duty-related traumatic stressors in the
18
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preceding year. The questionnaire was not a formally standardised psychometric
instrument. Data relating to the specific content of duty-related stressors was
used for the purpose of another study and will not be discussed in the present
study.
2.3.2. PTSD Symptom Scale: Self-Report version (PSS-SR; Foa et al., 1993)
The PSS-SR is a 17-item scale that measures the presence and severity of each
of DSM - IV symptom criteria on a 4-point Likert-type scale. The PSS-SR was
initially based on the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders: Third Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R) criteria (APA, 1987) but has been
altered by Faa and her colleagues to account for a minor change to DSM-IV
criteria. It consequently corresponds to the symptom criteria of the DSM-IV in its
present form with the three symptom clusters of intrusion, avoidance, and
arousal represented. The PSS-SR serves as a self-report scale for diagnosing
PTSD.
The PSS - SR has demonstrated highly satisfactory psychometric properties
(Faa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). Internal consistency of the total
symptom scale (0.91) and the three symptom clusters (0.78 for Intrusion, 0.80 for
Avoidance, and 0.82 for Arousal) were high. Moderate test-retest reliability over a
1-month period was obtained (correlation coefficient = 0.74). Faa et al. (1997)
stated that moderateness in test-retest reliability was to be expected due to the
differential rate of recovery of recently traumatised victims. The questionnaire
19
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has also showed good agreement with the Structured Clinical Interview (SCID;
Spitzer, Williams, Gibbons, & First, 1990), for DSM-III-R diagnoses of PTSD for
which the kappa was found to be 0.68 (Foa et al., 1993).
2.3.3. Event Probability Questionnaire (EPQ)
The EPa, a self-report scale designed to assess judgement of risk, consists of
25 items describing negative events that may, but not necessarily, have adverse
consequences. Participants were required to rate the likelihood of each event
occurring to them in the near future. Each item was rated on a 9-point Likert-type
Scale (0 = "not at all likely" to 8 = "extremely likely"). The scale was based upon
event probability questionnaires devised by Butler and Mathews (1983), Foa et
al. (1996), McNally and Foa (1987), Dalgleish, (1993), and Warda and Bryant
(1998). The scale was modified to address the hypotheses of the present study
and the nature of the subject group. The questionnaire consisted of four
subscales. The following section provides an explanation of the subscales
included in the EPa.
The first subscale, the External Harm Events Scale, involves events that may
have traumatic consequences should they occur, for example: "The next train
you board will derail". Seven external harm events were included in the EPa.
The second subscale, the General Negative Events Scale, involves general
unpleasant events without traumatic consequences, for example: "You will lock
your keys in your car". Eight general negative events were included in the EPa.
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The third subscale, the Social Events Scale, involves negative events within a
social context, for example: "Someone will be unfriendly to you at a shopping
centre". Five social items were included in the EPa. The fourth subscale, Work-
related Events, involves unpleasant events that may occur during the course of
EMS work, for example: "You will receive a difficult emergency callout". Five
work-related items were included in the EPa. The EPa was specifically designed
for the purpose of the present study. Previous event probability questionnaires
have not been standardised and consequently no psychometric data are
available for the instrument.
2.3.4. Beck Depression Inventory (BOl; Beck, et al., 1979)
The BOl is a frequently used self-report measure for assessing depressive
symptomatology. It consists of 84 self-evaluative statements grouped into 21
categories that assess the cognitive, motivational, and physiological symptoms of
depression based on a 1-week time frame. For each category there is a graded
series of four alternative statements, ranging from neutral to a maximum level of
severity. The items are scored from 0 - 3 so that the BOl scores range from 0 -
63. A total score in the 0 - 9 range should be regarded as indicative of no
depression, 10 - 15 range indicative of mild depression, 16 - 23 indicative of
moderate depression, and 24 - 63 indicative of severe depression (Shaw, Vallis,
& McCabe, 1985).
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The BOl has a high level of internal consistency, with the split-half reliability
coefficients averaging 0.86. Factor analyses conducted on the responses of
depressed patients have yielded three factors: sad mood/negative sense of self,
psychomotor retardation, and somatic depression. The BOl was included in the
present study to measure depression, an associated posttraumatic emotional
feature.
2.4. Procedure
Participants were visited at their places of work (duty stations) and asked to
complete the questionnaires. This was done during working hours and at the
beginning of a shift. Subjects were provided with written instructions. In addition
verbal reminders on how to approach the questions were given just prior to
completing the questionnaires. Participants completed the EWEa, PSS-SR,
EPa, and the BOl in a single session. Selected demographic information was
also obtained from participants during the assessment.
2.5. Statistical Analysis
In order to determine if a judgement bias was associated with PTSD,
comparisons between the PTSD group and the No PTSD group in terms of
scores on the EPa were conducted using t-tests. T-tests were also conducted to
determine if judgement bias was reflected in all the subscales of the EPa. When
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indicated by Levene's equality of variance test, t-tests based on unequal
variances were conducted.
To determine which component of posttraumatic symptomatology best accounted
for the variance in EPa scores Uudgement bias) a forward stepwise multiple
regression was conducted. On the supposition that there were no differences
between the subscales of the EPa in terms of the difference between the PTSD
group and the No PTSD group, the total EPa score was used in the regression
formula. PSS-SR-Intrusion, PSS-SR- Avoidance, PSS-SR-Arousal, and the BOl
scores were entered into the regression analysis with EPa scores.
3. Results
3.1.Comparison of PTSD and No PTSD groups
3.1.1. Age, work experience, and amount of exposure to trauma
Table 1 shows certain descriptive characteristics of the PTSD and the No PTSD
groups. The t-tests on these variables indicated that the PTSD group and the No
PTSD group did not differ significantly in terms of age, work experience (job
duration), and frequency of exposure to traumatic events.
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Table 1
Comparison of the PTSO and the No PTSO groups with regard to Age, Work
Experience, and Amount of Exposure to Trauma
Variable PTSO
M SO
No PTSO
M SO
!
Age 34.57 9.71 33.13 9.35 4.61 0.64
Experience 6.83 4.73 6.27 4.87 2.03 0.84
Exposure to 47.92 18.03 45.77 19.60 0.49 0.62
trauma
Exposure to trauma presented as mean units on the EMS Work Experiences
Questionnaire.
3.1.2. Psychopathology measures
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the groups in terms of psychopathology
measurements. The t-tests indicate that the PTSO group scored significantly
higher than the no PTSO group on the PSS-SR, PSS-SR subscales of Intrusion,
Avoidance, and Hyperarousal; and the BOl (Q< 0.001). The results indicate that
the PTSO group differed significantly from the No PTSO group on all
psychopathology measures.
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Table 2
Comparison of the PTSD and the No PTSD groups on the PTSD Symptom
Scale: Self - Report version and the Beck Depression Inventory
PTSD
M SD
No PTSD
M SD
Q
Scale
PSS-SR:
Total
22.81 7.98 5.54 6.22 -8.99 0.000
PSS-SR: 6.59 3.10 1.17 1.83 -8.78 0.000
Intrusion
PSS-SR:
Avoidance
9.44 3.70 2.18 2.67 -9.33 0.000
PSS-SR:
Arousal
6.77 3.78 2.17 3.03 -5.68 0.000
BDI 16.59 9.29 6.95 5.47 -6.37 0.000
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3.1.3. Judgement of risk
The results of the comparisons between the PTSD group and the No PTSD
group on the measures of judgement of risk are shown in Table 3. Scores are
presented as mean scores obtained on the EPa. (Total score on the EPa (EPa-
total), and the subscales of the EPa where EPa-THREAT refer to external harm
events, EPa-NEGATIVE to general negative events, EPa-SOCIAL to social
events, and EPa-EMS to work-related events).
3.1.3.1. EPQ-total
As indicated by comparisons of the total EPa scores the PTSD group
demonstrated significantly higher ratings for the likelihood of future negative
events in comparison to the No PTSD group, that is a significantly higher
judgement of risk.
3.1.3.2. EPQ subscales
It is clear from the results shown in Table 3 that the PTSD group demonstrated
significantly higher ratings for the likelihood of future negative events across all
the subscales of the EPa in comparison to the No PTSD group. The PTSD group
rated the likelihood of the occurrence of external harm events, general negative
events, social events, and work-related events significantly higher than the No
PTSD group, that is a significantly higher judgement of risk with regard to these
specific events.
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Table 3
Comparison of the PTSO and the No PTSO groups on the Event Probability
Questionnaire
PTSO
M SO
No PTSO
M SO
! 12
Scale
EPQ-Total 91.11 37.96 63.09 25.70 -4.11 0.000
EPQ-THREAT 22.44 12.32 14.58 8.11 -3.71 0.000
EPQ-NEGATIVE 33.14 18.78 21.17 11.01 -3.94 0.000
EPQ-SOCIAL 17.81 6.12 14.31 3.84 -2.446 0.016
EPQ-EMS 17.70 6.94 13.02 6.82 -3.008 0.004
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The results of the t-test for equivalency of means on the EPa indicates that
traumatised EMS personnel showed an increased estimation of judgement of risk
in comparison to non-traumatised EMS personnel, that is, a judgement bias was
found. In addition, the judgement bias was pervasive and extended across a
range of eventualities to include events that were externally harmful, negative
(unpleasant without threatening/traumatic consequences), socially related, and
work-related. Results of the current study indicated that judgement bias in PTSD
is not restricted to threatening events and is generalised across a range of
events.
3.2. Predictors of judgement bias
In order to establish which component of post-traumatic stress was the best
predictor of judgement bias, a forward stepwise multiple regression analysis was
carried out. PSS-SR Intrusion, PSS-SR Avoidance, PSS-SR Arousal, and BOl
were entered as independent variables. The dependant variable was the total
score on the EPa.
Table 4 presents a model summary of the multiple regression analysis. PSS-SR
Avoidance accounted for 14% of the variance of EPa scores. The result of the
regression analysis indicated that avoidance symptomatology was the best
predictor of the psychopathology measures entered, although it did not account
for a large percentage of the variance in judgement bias.
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 4
Summary of Forward Stepwise Multiple Regression of the Event Probability
Questionnaire
Adjusted
R2 Tolerance P
PSS-SR
Avoidance
0.14 0.31 0.39 2.76 0.001
PSS-SR = PTSD Symptom Scale Self Report
4. Discussion
The primary aim of the current study was to establish whether PTSD in EMS
personnel was associated with a judgement bias for risk events and to determine
whether the judgement bias extended across a range of negative events.
Participants with PTSD exhibited greater judgement bias for risk events. This
bias extended to include external harm events, general negative events, social
events, and work-related events. A secondary aim of the present study was to
determine what dimension of post-traumatic symptomatology best predicted the
variance in judgement bias. Avoidance symptomatology accounted for 14% of
the variance of judgement bias.
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4.1. Judgement bias
EMS personnel with PTSD showed higher judgements of risk in comparison to
EMS personnel without PTSD. The results are consistent with previous studies in
which judgement bias was demonstrated in other anxiety disorders (Butler &
Mathews, 1983; Foa et al., 1996) and other traumatised groups (Dalgleish, 1993;
Smith & Bryant, in press; Warda & Bryant, 1998). The finding that PTSD
participants evidenced judgement bias supports the information processing
theory of Foa et al. (1989) which states that post-traumatic stress involves
exaggerated beliefs about one's own vulnerability.
The main findings of the present study can also be understood in terms of the
cognitive action theory of Chemtob et al. (1988) which states that the threat
arousal network is permanently activated in PTSD, thereby increasing the
likelihood that individuals will search for and identify threatening information. The
judgement bias found in this study can be seen as a consequence of the
proclivity of individuals with PTSD to focus on threat-related information.
The finding that PTSD participants exhibited judgement bias can be viewed from
the availability heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the "spreading
activation" account (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985), and the ''feelings as information"
hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Participants with PTSD did not differ from
participants without PTSD in terms of frequency of exposure to duty-related
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traumatic situations, indicating that factors besides the objective frequency of
threat-related events in memory resulted in the observed judgement bias. The
availability heuristic and the "spreading activation" account have shown that a
negative mood state results in an increase in judgement of risk by expanding the
availability in memory of events linked to the particular emotional state (Williams,
et al., 1997). The ''feelings as information" hypothesis suggests that a negative
mood-state serves as an information source in making judgements of risk.
Participants with PTSD exhibited judgement bias on the subscales of the EPQ,
namely external harm, general negative, social, and work-related events.
Judgement bias was consequently generalised across a range of events in PTSD
in the present study. The findings of the present study support the results of
Smith and Bryant (in press) which indicate that judgement bias extended to
include not just externally harmful events, but also somatic and socially related
negative events.
The finding that traumatised participants showed judgement bias across all the
subscales of the EPQ can be understood in terms of the proposal of Foa et al.
(1989) that the fear networks that develop following trauma involve larger, more
diffuse, and more loosely associated fear structures than those of other anxiety
disorders. The results of the present study support the proposition that
judgement bias in PTSD generalises to a wider range of events (i.e., to less fear
specific events). In other anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder and social
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phobia, judgement biases are limited to those events that are related to the
particular fear (Foa et al. 1996; McNally & Foa, 1987).
The finding that EMS personnel with PTSD showed judgement biases across a
range of negative events is also consistent with the cognitive explanations of
judgement processes in negative emotional states. The availability heuristic and
the "spreading activation" account propose that negative mood results in an
increase in the judgement of risk across a range of events by increasing the
availability in memory of events linked to the particular emotional state. It can be
argued that the activation in memory of all events linked to the mood-state
characteristic of PTSD resulted in the generalised judgement bias demonstrated
in this study.
The ''feelings as information" hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) proposed that
individuals use their current mood state as a source of information when judging
the likelihood of risk, the mood state serving as evidence for a wide range of
judgements. The results of the present study can be viewed from this
explanation, the mood state typical of PTSD served as evidence for a wide range
of judgements and as a result all negative events were rated as more likely to
occur.
The current study did not establish which cognitive explanation was the most
pertinent in understanding the findings. Recent evidence has suggested that
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availability, spreading activation, and mood state as evidence processes occur
together, the dominant process depending on the situation (Forgas, 1995).
Further research of judgement processes in PTSO can therefore be directed at
investigating different cognitive mechanisms involved in the judgement of risk in
emotional disorders.
4.2. Avoidance as a predictor of judgement bias
Avoidance symptomatology was the best predictor of the variance in judgement
bias. This finding is similar to previous studies where avoidance was the most
significant factor in accounting for the variance in judgement bias (Smith &
Bryant, in press; Warda & Bryant, 1998). This may reflect a tendency for
traumatised individuals to avoid threatening stimuli because they perceive them
to be associated with adverse consequences (Smith & Bryant, in press).
Warda and Bryant (1998) reported a higher level of prediction for avoidance in a
group of persons with ASO. The lower predictive power found for avoidance in
the present study may reflect a different symptom phenomenology in ASO
compared to PTSO. An alternative explanation may be that a wider range of
post-traumatic symptomatology accounted for the judgement bias in the present
study.
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4.3. Study limitations and recommendations
The current study provided evidence of judgement bias in PTSD and of the
generalisation of judgement bias in PTSD. In addition evidence was found for the
role of avoidance symptomatology as a predictor of judgement bias.
It is however recognised that the present study has several limitations. Firstly,
although the structure of previous measures of judgement of risk was followed
(Butler & Mathews, 1983; Dalgleish, 1993; Foa et al., 1996; Warda & Bryant,
1998), the psychometric properties of the EPQ are unknown. The establishment
of a standardised questionnaire and subsequent validation would enhance
further studies of judgement bias in anxiety disorders. Secondly, the study did not
include a sample of normal controls for comparison purposes. It is therefore not
known to what extent the judgement bias observed in traumatised EMS
personnel deviates from that of the non-traumatised general population. The
establishment of norms for the EPQ in the general population will prove valuable
for future investigations of judgement bias in clinical populations. Thirdly, the
proposal that PTSD is characterised by more pervasive biases than in other
anxiety disorders needs to be established by comparing PTSD and other anxiety
disordered populations. Fourthly, the design utilised in this study does not index
the extent to which the judgement bias observed in PTSD participants reflects
either a response to a traumatic experience or a predisposing cognitive style.
Prospective research is required to determine the extent to which judgement bias
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is a vulnerability factor in the development of posttraumatic stress. Longitudinal
studies of individuals before they become traumatised could determine the extent
to which judgement bias is a vulnerability factor in the development of PTSD.
EMS personnel constitute a convenient population for prospective research due
to their availability for assessment in their initial training phase and then at a later
stage. Finally, although avoidance was the most significant predictor of
judgement bias, further research is required to determine the cognitive
mechanisms responsible for the observed judgement bias and to determine if
other psychopathology predicts judgement bias.
4.4. Study implications
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned limitations it is suggested that the
evidence of judgement bias in PTSD in this study has relevant implications. The
findings of the current study point towards the validity of cognitive models of
PTSDand provided evidence for cognitive explanations of judgement processes.
In addition, the utility of cognitive therapy for persons with PTSD is indicated by
evidence of distorted cognitive processes. An increased understanding of the
specific nature of cognitive biases in PTSD may clarify the precise focus of
cognitive interventions with traumatised individuals.
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